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Abstract
The importance of cybersecurity of cyber-physical
systems is increasing across the wide spectrum of
critical infrastructure systems and resulting in
governmental attention to methods of reducing risks.
Although these systems use computers to manage the
communication and control of the processes, the
systems are distinctly different from IT systems in
business. Securing these cyber-physical systems
require a different approach and set of tools. There
are some unique characteristics of the physical
systems under control that can be used to help
mitigate risks associated with control system failures.
This paper examines how security measures need to
take a wider approach than just application of IT
controls to a new environment if one is interested in
truly managing the risk of these systems.

1. Introduction
Cyber-physical systems are systems where
computers control physical processes. These systems
exist in manufacturing, industrial settings,
transportation, and a wide range of applications
where computers are used to control actual real-world
processes[1]. What makes these systems different
from standard IT systems is that these systems
control physical processes directly. This makes the
risk equation different because of the impact
associated with the physical system[2]. Because
many of our critical infrastructures have an
operational technology based cyber component,
securing them has become an issue of importance to
government, at national and local levels.
The challenge of applying security practices to
cyber-physical systems lies in their structural
differences from standard IT systems. These
differences have resulted in the application of
computers and networking being labeled as
operational technology (OT) to distinguish it from
standard IT. There are a host of differences between
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computer systems used in operational technology
versus information technology. OT systems can have
lifetimes in decades, and updates and changes are
exceedingly rare. OT computer systems become
integrated into the physical processes that they
control, and changes are time consuming and
expensive. From a security perspective, they have
completely different risk profiles from an IT
system[2]. One of the principal differences in IT and
OT systems lies in their security policies. The
security policy of an IT system is defined around the
data and the principles of confidentiality, integrity
and availability. For OT systems, the security policy
is defined around safe and resilient operations. The
implications of these differences are significant and
can be seen throughout how the systems are
designed, built and operated.
There are many unique challenges associated with
OT systems that can complicate efforts to apply
standard cybersecurity practices. There are also some
unique characteristics that can be used to enhance
overall system security. Because of their connection
to actual physical processes, risk can be expressed in
terms of consequences to a physical system, and the
losses can be significantly more complicated and
dangerous than simple data losses.
This paper examines the unique characteristics of
cyber-physical systems, OT, and their associated risk
issues. It does so through a lens that will assist in the
development of appropriate and applicable risk
mitigation standards and policies that can be
employed by regulatory bodies to these unique
systems. The objective of this paper is to highlight
some of the key differences between IT and OT
systems that can be employed to assist in proper
security postures. The physical consequences of the
system under control offers some unique perspectives
in managing security risk in these systems.
Understanding and using the unique differences in
OT systems is important when developing policies
and regulations to manage cybersecurity risk across
these critical systems.
The term critical infrastructure is widely used in
industry and government and is defined as systems
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“whose incapacity or destruction would have a
debilitating impact on our defense and economic
security”[3].
This paper begins with an examination of OT
systems and their unique characteristics. In section 3
it examines methods of examining cybersecurity risk
in OT systems. Section 4 shows how these methods
can be applied to OT systems, using their unique
characteristics to improve risk postures. Section 5
examines how cybersecurity is actually practiced in
OT systems, contrasting this with the more
commonly understood practices employed in IT
system. The paper concludes with conclusions and
next steps.

2. System Characteristics
IT and OT systems, while using many of the same
components
are
substantially
different
in
configuration and use. Initially OT systems were
networked using proprietary protocols and private
communication paths. While IT systems were
designed to increase in value through greater
connectivity, OT systems thrived via isolation[4].
Three major changes have occurred over the past
couple of decades that have driven change in OT
system architectures. The first two act as partners in
crime, TCP/IP networking flourishes and becomes
ubiquitous at the same time businesses realize the
value in real-time use of operational data. These
changes resulted in many OT systems adopting
TCP/IP for networking and the connection of OT and
IT networks. The third point is the use of wireless
networking to reduce networking connection costs.
While these changes have brought about a
convergence of IT and OT networks, there is still a
significant difference in the two networks when
examined from a risk or security point of view.

2.1 IT System Characteristics
IT systems have been defined by the types of data
they handle in an organization. It is tough to find a
business that does not have some from of IT, for
information has become key to most if not all
businesses. From things such as email, to web, to
data storage, business management, inventory
management, manufacturing execution systems, and
more – data drives the modern enterprise. And when
the data stops, in many cases, so does the business as
illustrated by the plague of ransomware in the past
few years[5, 6].

2.2 OT System Characteristics
Historically, OT systems had little resemblance to
traditional IT systems in business. OT systems are
specific purpose systems, not general purpose like IT.
OT systems were isolated systems, using isolated
networks, running proprietary protocols using
specialized hardware and software.
Many OT
components were in physically secured areas and
they were not connected to IT networks or systems
While the computers used in operational
technology networks are many times the same type of
PC, using the same operating systems (sometimes
older versions) as found in most business networks,
they live in a completely different environment.
These differences stem from a couple of key
differences between IT and OT networks. The first
major difference is that OT networks support a host
of additional connected devices that are not
computers running standard OS’s, but rather are
special purpose devices such as programmable logic
controllers (PLCs), remote terminal unites (RTUs),
and human machine interfaces (HMIs). These devices
form the backbone of the connection between the
computers and networks, and the physical devices
under control. These devices were also designed and
created long before security was a primary concern
and designed for resilience and 100% availability. As
such, they as a general rule do not use forms of
authentication, encryption, or other endpoint security
functionality. This provides an interesting security
issue as there is no ability to manage access control
to these devices. So even if it can be invoked on the
computer running the specialized software, access
control cannot extend to the physical devices that are
being controlled.
The lack of defined users via access control
mechanisms throughout an OT system makes
security controls such as defined in NIST SP800-53
meaningless. Without the elements of confidentiality,
integrity and availability, the entire basis of the
security control structure falls apart. That is not to
imply that the controls are not useful, for they can be,
but it definitely changes how, when, and where they
can be employed. This issue goes directly to the hear
of the difference in IT security postures which
support an IT security policy and OT security efforts
to support the OT security policy. Because of the
differences in policy objectives between the two,
these implementation differences are not drastic as
one would immediately suspect.
The network architectures employed in OT
networks stands in stark contrast to that of IT. In IT
networks, the basic idea is to have as flat a network
as possible, with as few impediments to traffic as
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possible, and let the Internet Protocol stack manage
the traffic. This is fine when the objective is to let
everything talk to everything, and in many IT
networks the breadth of network conversations is
significant. In OT networks, there are a limited
number of specific communication channels
employed. PLC’s talk to HMIs and historians, HMI’s
talk to PLC’s and historians, but PLC’s don’t talk to
another PLC. Typically, only one protocol is used
locally, so the variety of traffic; FTP, HTTP, email,
etc., is not seen on the OT network. This reduction in
traffic is essential given the nature of OT message
timings, and failure to segregate traffic and OT
system isolation failures have led to disasters[7].
Another major difference between IT and OT
systems is in their design philosophy. While IT
systems are all about the data, OT systems are all
about operating safely and with resilience[4]. IT
systems have been advancing on a technology driven
curve for the past 30+ years, with refresh lifecycles
of 3 to 5 years. New OS’s, new processors, new
software, a PC that is 5 years old is considered
ancient in the IT environment. OT systems were
designed and built for 20 to 30-year lifecycles. This
means it is not uncommon to find older versions of
hardware and software still in service in OT systems.
Because of the nature of the physical processes under
OT system control, change is not a good thing, and
neither is downtime. These systems can run for years
without rebooting or being taken down for
maintenance. This makes things like patching a
challenge. Any change to a system, either by
upgrade or patch, must undergo a thorough
examination to ensure it does not cause unintended
consequences to a system’s overall operation.
OT networks are also different when looked at
from a signal timing perspective. OT messages are
typically time sensitive and networks are designed to
ensure there is sufficient bandwidth to ensure timely
communications. While this seems trivial, realize that
many OT networks can extend over large distances,
in the case of pipelines, thousands of kilometers.
Network connectivity across the entire reach of an
OT network is also a challenge, as the standard high
bandwidth IT networks in business do not necessarily
extend well in widespread and industrial
environments. Many OT systems were hardwired RS232 systems before networking replaced these
communication channels and the message sequencing
versus bandwidth issues were measured and designed
into the systems. Today’s networking protocols make
those decisions a thing of the past, but there are still
communication implications when missing even a
single message can become an issue.

An example can be seen in something as simple
as the addition of a new switch on the network, with
new devices. Even if the network has sufficient
bandwidth to ensure no loss of current signals, the
simple act of the network reconfiguring it’s spanning
tree protocol, an automatic function, can result in a
45 second to one minute traffic delay. To an IT
network, this is rarely a problem. But in that time in
an operational system, many critical messages may
be lost in an OT network, resulting in the system
being shut down by safety systems because they
believe the network to be non-responsive.
There is much talk of convergence of OT and IT
networks, and if by convergence, one is referring to
connections, then, yes, they are being cross
connected. But when convergence means operations,
then the answer is clearly no, the two systems are
operated completely differently[8]. Simply put, the
differences between IT and OT make security
functions a completely different world.

3. Cybersecurity Risk Analysis for OT
Systems
Functional cybersecurity is an exercise in risk
management. One of the foundational elements is
risk analysis, an examination of the sources and
impacts of the various risk factors to an enterprise.
There are a variety of tools and methodologies used
to perform these analysis tasks, and each has
strengths and weaknesses.
In IT systems, risk is typically examined with
respect to the CIA model; confidentiality, integrity,
and availability, and in the end is centered around
data-specific issues. In OT systems, the assessment of
risk includes physical effects; damage to people,
process, and the environment. These result in
profoundly different methods of assessment and
outcomes. For OT systems, an analysis of potential
physical damage to the facility, the system output,
persons, and the environment needs to be considered.
An analysis of the drivers of risk can be done in
several different methods. The simple method of
quantitative risk analysis from probability and impact
is one method, examining the cybersecurity kill chain
another and bow tie analysis is yet a third. Each of
these has a useful role to play in how we measure and
manage IT risks, and each can be employed in OT
systems.
OT systems have an additional element that can
be leveraged in controlling risk, and those are the
specific physical properties of the system under
control. Physical systems have limitations that can be
used to mitigate risk in the event of control issues
from the OT side of the system. The use of
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engineering design in the form of consequence
centered engineering can provide significant risk
reductions in a system.

3.1 Quantitative Risk Measurement
One of the standard quantitative measures used to
determine overall risk in cybersecurity is represented
by the equation:

be used to determine the best place in the lifecycle of
an attack to mount a defense.
In the case of cybersecurity attacks, the stages of
the Kill Chain are presented in Figure 1. The Kill
Chain provides defenders a simplistic picture of a
cybersecurity event as a linear process that moves
consecutively through specific stages, with the
objective of highlighting potential defensive activity
points.[11]

Risk = Likelihood of an adverse event
× Impact of the adverse event [9]
The two key factors are the likelihood of
something happening and the impact if it does. These
factors can be used in a variety of forms, both
quantitative and qualitative to determine risk
postures. They can also be done in aggregate, or as a
series of individual independent elements. This
methodology has its roots in how insurance losses
can be calculated actuarily, but it has some
significant limitations. First, it has scaling issues with
complexities. As systems can be comprised of
subsystems, and the number of elements increase,
determining all of the individual risks becomes an
algebraic solution of a bookkeeping nightmare. While
the summations can be easy, both is serial and
parallel forms, the determination of all of the
individual factors grows beyond the ability to track.
The second major issue is that the events we are
protecting against are not necessarily independent. If
a hacker achieves access using a specific method
against one of your machines, it is a solid bet it will
happen again against other machines in your
network.
So, while this is a good method of determining the
risk associated with losing assets, it is not a proactive
method of analyzing all of the individual risks to
determine overall composite risks.

3.2 Cybersecurity Kill Chain
The process of a Cyber Kill Chain was developed
by Lockheed Martin to analyze the steps attackers
use against systems to assist defenders in determining
defense strategies[10]. The kill chain concept is
similar to the lifecycle analysis of an organism in
biology, where a system is observed across its
lifecycle, and then at appropriate points the system
can be attacked.
This analysis of lifecycle
weaknesses relies upon a consistent pattern of events
across the lifecycle of an object or system.
Cybersecurity related attacks tend to follow a known
pattern of sequential steps and this information can

Figure 1. Cybersecurity Kill Chain [11]
The kill chain’s most useful purpose is to help
defenders determine where the best opportunities are
for detecting attacks and defending against them. It is
not necessary to interrupt all the aspects of the
attacker’s actions, represented as steps on the kill
chain. Rather it is important to catch and stop
attackers before they get to the final objective. So,
while it may be difficult or impractical to attempt to
stop an attacker at the earlier stages, there are points
in the kill chain where activity can be observed and
attacks stopped. Using multiple points and
implementing a defense in depth approach can be
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effective at greatly increasing the odds of catching
and stopping an attack.
The cybersecurity kill chain also suffers from a
scale problem in that large systems of systems, such
as modern IT enterprises, this methodology has to be
performed over and over at multiple locations, as
attacks that are local may not be observed at a
distance. This same issue can affect critical
infrastructure systems, where there are many systems
of systems that can be loosely connected and result in
the need for repeated defensive structures. The
strength of the Cyber Kill Chain methodology when
employed on OT systems comes from the simplicity
of the OT network, limiting the points of interaction
to a few key places in the network. The network
enclaving of traffic works to enhance the chance of
detection of specific events associated with the kill
chain, improving its utility.
When employed from an appropriate level of
analysis, the cybersecurity kill chain has proven itself
to be a useful tool in defending against many
sophisticated attacks such as advanced persistent
threats. This tool allows the concentration of
detection forces where they can be most effective,

Figure 2. Simplified Bow Tie Analysis
and the employment of defensive controls where
they can be most effective, even when these are in
separate parts of the kill chain. When employed as a
series of overlapping defense in depth methods, this
methodology has proven very effective in combating
the complex attacks faced in many systems today.

3.3 Bow Tie Risk Analysis
Bow Tie (BT) is a graphical method commonly
used for process risk analysis. It combines Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) to
prioritize risk management activities. [12, 13] The
undesired event is the top event of the fault tree.
Using the undesired event as the pivot node, BT
employs FT to determine the potential causes and ET
to determine the potential consequences for the
undesired event. The bow tie methodology provides
information both on the causes of risk, and the
consequences from failures to mitigate the risks,
producing a more comprehensive picture of the
overall risk exposures in a system.
The bow tie analysis method is particularly good
at analyzing multiple different causes and effects
associated with failures, whether from a purposeful
attack or merely a failure of some component. This
makes the bow tie method very useful in an all
hazards approach that is used in many systems, both
in IT and OT to determine specific risk elements.

A sample graphical depiction of BT analysis is
shown in Figure 2.
This simplified model shows that controls can be
placed on left hand side to address the fault tree items
that can lead to the undesired event. These controls
can be against specific root causes, or against factors
that can escalate the situation.
Should the undesired event occur, then the
consequences of the event are modeled using event
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trees to illustrate the various risks and potential
mitigation or recovery controls. Putting these all to
work in the form of a ransomware infection example
will help clarify the processes involved. For
ransomware, the undesired event is a ransomware
infection. The outcome of this infection can be minor
– the loss of a few files and inconvenience, or it
could result in the loss of the whole business if all
data is lost, or somewhere between these two
extremes. The causes of the ransomware infection
can be many, from simple phishing attacks, to
watering hole attacks, to advanced attacks, although
not infinite, a great many ways to initiate a
ransomware attack exist. This can make the total size
of the detailed fault tree very difficult to manage. If a
multilayer approach is used, many of the individual
initial elements can combine into common elements,
making the defensive approach more manageable
with later application of controls after the
combination of sources occurs.
In the case of ransomware, if it occurs (the central
event), multiple consequences can occur, across the
range already described. A series of mitigation and
recovery tools, such as parallel systems, backups, and
network isolations can be employed to prevent the
spread and subsequent damage from the attack.
Again, as in the previous models, the scalability
of the bow tie model is challenging as system
complexity increases and the number of threats
increase. Although the calculus of managing the data
can be done with Bayesian networks [13], this
method rapidly becomes challenging with the myriad
of risks associated with modern computer systems.
All of these risk models work well to an intended
level of complexity and are useful for managing risk
at high levels. None of them are useful against
individual threats to individual components on a
system with hundreds of threats against hundreds of
interconnected components. The math, while as
accurate as the inputs, becomes meaningless with
respect to being an actionable component in the
management of the system.

4. Application of Risk Management to
CPS
The application of risk management to cyberphysical systems is not new or novel. These systems
are engineered systems and have used methods such
as fault trees and failure mode effect analysis to
manage failures for decades. One of the major
differences between IT and OT networks is the level
of risk driven control exerted over changes in the
systems.

In IT networks, there are varying level of change
control mechanisms used, but at the end of the day,
the network, its components, and software elements
are updated and changed on a fairly regular basis.
This has become standard practice and is a security
best practice. The patching of known flaws and the
updating of software is a routine task. Similar is the
employment of security controls such as
antivirus/antimalware programs, access control
mechanisms including two factor methods for high
risk systems, and controls such as backups to restore
data when lost or damaged.
In OT systems, the use of change control is highly
controlled. Systems are rarely updated, for that would
require them to be shut down and restarted. Systems
such as pipelines, utility grids, refineries, chemical
plants, they run 24 hours by 7 days a week by 365
days a year, and if possible, for multiple years
between shutdowns. As most of these systems are
actually systems of systems, there are times that
individual components can be updated, changed,
repaired or fixed. But change comes with a risk of
will the system work the exact same way as before?
In IT systems we have all heard the stories of how a
specific patch caused an issue, resulting in the change
control process forcing it to be backed out and the
original system restored. Many times, there is a time
lag between these changes, so in essence a second
change corrects the first. In the case of an OT system,
this “outage” can have severe physical consequences.
If an IT system goes down, and data is lost, then a
good backup system can restore it. In an OT system,
if the system fails from an update, equipment can
become damaged, people hurt, or environmental
damage, none of these can be addressed via a backup
strategy. This is the basis of the security policy that is
focused on safety and resilience. Safety protects the
system, resilience protects the output of the system.

5. OT system security
OT systems have distinctly different attack
taxonomies than IT systems[14-16]. There are a wide
range of reasons, but one of the most common is the
attacker objective. For an OT system, the attacker
objectives include such elements as loss of control, or
loss of view, elements designed to separate plant
operations from operator control. When examining
incidents such as Stuxnet or the Ukrainian electric
grid attack, these elements become clear. OT security
elements are specifically designed to prevent these
problems, regardless of the source, from impacting
the security of the facility.
In most OT systems, there is a fall back system,
the safety system, that is integrated into system
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operations with one overarching objective; do not
allow the system to fail to an unsafe position. These
safety systems are not specifically part of the security
system, they exist as a last line of defense, but the
manner in which they are constructed goes to the
point of using the system itself as a security
mechanism.
OT systems have been designed for years using a
completely different network architecture designed to
provide isolation and resiliency to its component
structures. This architecture, know as the Purdue
architecture, defines zones and conduits that are used
to control information flow and thus control across a
system[17]. In OT systems, the role of network as a
security control has diminished in importance as
networks have become hardened to specific attack
and network security is no longer in the top 20
security controls list. But in OT networks, the
network is part of the system and its role in ensuring
system resilience is important because the network is
part of the control system and the control system is
part of the overall operational system, thus network
issues can become system issues. This goes beyond
simple data or transport issues, but to the core of the
overall system. This makes network isolation as
defined in ISA-99 a key security component in the
overall system.
Another key operational characteristic of the
system that can lead to better security is the design of
the specific components so that failure result in a safe
state or at least a state that physically cannot become
catastrophic. An example of this is in a water
treatment plant where chemicals are added to water
for potability – typically a chlorine agent to disinfect.
If an unlimited supply, both in quantity and in
delivery rate were available, then an attacker could
command an unsafe amount of additive. But if the
system is designed so that no more than a 50%
increase in additive rate could ever be applied, and
this level is still in the safe range, then this
engineering design would never fail to an unsafe
level.
Another example is the use of output filters to test
output conditions before applying them to the
physical system. The concept of having these filters
post control system allows them to mediate outputs
without influence from an external source. Many
traffic lights use just such a system, so that when the
logic circuits tell the lights to change patterns, this
circuit then interprets the new condition to see if it is
legal. Even if the PLCs tell all lights to turn green,
this filter then intercepts this output, determines it is
not allowed and switches the lights to a safe alternate
state -typically all flashing red. It then disconnects
the system from the control circuit until it is reset.

The use of these physical controls, be it a pipe
size that restricts flow, a separate system to check
outputs, a set of mechanical stops to prevent specific
unallowed movement, these are all physical process
elements that can be designed into the system to
assist in the attainment of safe and resilient operation.
There are many additional OT specific security
methods that are employed to fulfill the security
policy mandate, but for the purposes of this paper, the
key elements are the focus on the security objective
differences and the use of physical process controls
as part of a system solution.

6. Conclusions
IT and OT systems while sharing many similar or
even identical components have dramatically
different environments and operating characteristics.
These are clearly summed up in the different security
policies employed. While security policies are high
level in nature, most OT systems have inherent
physical properties that are also foundational in
nature and can be used to help manage risk. This
paper examined some of the differences and
demonstrated why OT systems require different
security mechanisms than IT systems. This is
important to consider these differences when
developing government regulations and standards
associated with OT based critical infrastructure
controls.
When examining the levers one has to control
with respect to securing critical infrastructure
elements that are built with cyber-physical systems it
is of utmost importance not to fall into the trap of
thinking these are just another IT system. OT systems
have different capabilities and limitations than IT
systems, both on a component level and on a system
level. Attempting to regulate security using rules and
objectives from a different domain will result is less
than optimal outcomes. Early attempts in the
regulation of cybersecurity in the electric sector led
to rules that any network connected device must use
an antivirus solution or have a written exception
report. This led to many technical feasibility
exception reports for routers and switches, as these
are network connected devices, and although they
never could run an antivirus solution, the rules didn’t
care.
Meaningful security solutions can be had for the
cyber-physical systems that comprise the critical
infrastructure systems of our society. Regulations can
be made that help in the proper securing of this
important asset. What is important is that the
regulations be drafted for the OT systems in a manner
that is befitting them, not an IT system. Mandating
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that all communications be encrypted end to end with
a specific level of user level authentication may make
sense in IT systems, but in the majority of OT
systems these elements are not even possible.

7. Future work
This paper examined some key differences
between IT and OT systems when it comes to
cybersecurity. There is a whole new class of systems,
built around the Internet of Things concept, where the
scale of number of devices becomes incredibly large
and possibly over the entire globe. These systems,
whether called the Internet of Things (IOT) or the
Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT) will have
different security objectives and methods because
they too will be different than either IT or OT
systems. Regulating these systems will need to be
done through the lens of their capabilities and
limitations, and not done as we are doing either IT or
OT systems.
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